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“NO TRESPASSING”: RAILROAD LAND GRANTS,
THE RIGHT OF EXCLUSION, AND THE ORIGINS OF
FEDERAL FOREST CONSERVATION
SEAN M. KAMMER*

ABSTRACT
The Forest Management Act of 1897 established a management model
for public lands that, for the most part, remains intact. It embodies a
balancing of control and conservation of forest resources such as timber,
minerals, and forage with provisions for the exploitation of those resources
for private gain. This article explores the historical context in which this
landmark legislation arose. It examines the role of large railroad
companies, particularly those that received extensive land subsidies, in first
challenging the long-standing custom of timber as an open-access resource
in the American West. By enforcing their right of exclusion against timber
trespassers in the court system, these railroad companies—while simply
acting in their own pecuniary interest—helped effect a shift in natural
resources policy from one emphasizing privatization and rapid development
to one incorporating government ownership and centralized management.
This article, however, illustrates the extent to which the allocation of
resources can operate as a one-way ratchet. It is all too easy to give nature
away; it is not so easy to get it back.

*
Assistant Professor, University of South Dakota School of Law. The author wishes to
thank Will Thomas and Sandi Zellmer for their mentorship and guidance, including but certainly
not limited to the content of this article.
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INTRODUCTION

The extent to which formal law has impeded the ability of the
government to implement new federal public lands policies has been a
recent theme of much literature on natural resources law. Legal scholar
Charles F. Wilkinson, for example, has blamed many of the contemporary
problems in natural resources law on its origins in “the lords of yesterday,”
a set of laws, policies, and ideas from another time. 1 These “lords of
yesterday,” in his account, include the notions of “first in time, first in

1. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE WEST xiii (1992).
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right” for minerals, grazing land, and water, the construction of dams
mainly for hydropower, and the establishment of logging as the dominant
use of national forests. They continue to shape current policy and legal
debates despite the fact that they no longer align with the socio-economic
values of westerners or with current scientific understandings. Specifically,
these pro-development policies are inconsistent with the broad consensus
among westerners that, while resources should be developed, the pursuit of
development should be, in Wilkinson’s words, “balanced and prudent, with
precautions taken to ensure sustainability, to protect health, to recognize
environmental values, to fulfill community values, and to provide a fair
return to the public.”2 Wilkinson attributed the persistence of these
outmoded laws and ideas to a number of factors, including the inherent
inertia of legal and political doctrines, the power of lobbying forces, and a
lack of public awareness, all of which have conspired to wall off natural
resources law and policy behind a “shield of perceived complexity.”3
Regarding the “lord of yesterday” governing the national forests,
Wilkinson contended that this policy was achieved in a different manner
than laws regarding mining, grazing, or water. Whereas westerners
informally fashioned their mining and grazing laws before Congress
sanctioned them, Wilkinson argued that eastern conservationists were the
primary movers behind federal timber policy. In his account, the ideology
and writings of Gifford Pinchot, the first head of the Forest Service
beginning in 1905, are central to understanding how modern natural
resources law came to be. Pinchot advocated the wise management of
economic activities, including grazing and timber harvesting, within a
system of national forests, all with the goal of ensuring both an equitable
allocation of benefits in the present and a stable supply into the future.4
These ideas indeed came to dominate public land management over the
twentieth century.5
This narrative, however, implies that some degree of consensus formed
around Pinchot’s ideas and that Congress then imposed such ideas
wholesale on communities in the West. My research suggests a far more
complicated narrative. The form of progressive conservation that Pinchot
represented, as an intellectual movement, may have originated among
professional elites in the East and in Europe. However, the implementation
of conservationist principles also required a confrontation with certain
2. Id. at 17.
3. Id. at xiii.
4. Id. at 128-29; see also SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF
EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 27-39 (1999).
5. HAYS, supra note 4, at 251.
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assumptions that had shaped American attitudes toward—as well as the
laws governing—natural resources from the seventeenth century to the end
of the nineteenth century. These assumptions included a belief in the
abundance of un-owned land and natural resources, a belief that natural
resources were limitless, and a corresponding belief that immediate use was
best. James Willard Hurst, commonly regarded as the founder of “new
legal history,” detailed how these cultural assumptions were reflected in
core principles of American law. According to Hurst, the principle that
society should promote the “release of creative human energy” by providing
humans the greatest extent of freedom as possible permeated nineteenth
century American law.6 This principle was reflected in the central tenet of
nineteenth century public land law: the preference for granting to
individuals and companies the liberty and incentive to secure and develop
natural resources as they saw fit and to bring the products of those resources
to market. It also contributed to the prevailing view of Americans towards
all public resources, namely that they were freely available to the first
person to make use of them.7
Western railroads were among the most important of the economic
actors with vested legal rights and economic interests established through
application of the “release of creative energy” principle. By the end of the
nineteenth century, railroads had come to be seen not only as manifestations
of the growth of corporate power in the United States, but also as
representative of the federal government’s nineteenth century approach to
public lands, the failures and corrupt implementation of that approach, and
the apparent threat of resource depletion that resulted.8 Many saw railroads
as the primary beneficiaries of the federal government’s nineteenth century
public lands policy of converting the public domain into privately held
property as rapidly and cheaply as feasible in order to stimulate economic
development.9 Indeed, railroads were granted a substantial portion of the
federal government’s public domain in the West. Between 1850 and 1871,
the federal government granted to railroads roughly 130 million acres, the

6. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 6 (1956).
7. See generally Sean Kammer, Public Opinion is More than Law: Popular Sovereignty and
Vigilantism in the Nebraska Territory, 31 GREAT PLAINS Q. 309 (2011); George C. Coggins &
Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Management II: The Commons and
the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (1982).
8. See WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 122.
9. Wilkinson characterized the “main thrust” of such policies as being the desire “to transfer
public resources into private hands on a wholesale basis in order to conquer nature.” Id. at 18.
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vast majority of which was west of the Mississippi River.10 Partially due to
these extensive land grants, railroad companies became some of the largest
landowners in the country, as well as the largest owners of forests. Indeed,
two of the three largest owners of timberlands in the country were the
Southern Pacific and the Northern Pacific, both of which received millions
of acres of timberlands from the government.11
It has become almost an axiom among legal scholars of natural
resources law and policy that the various inconsistencies and inefficiencies
embedded in current management regimes are the result of historical
contingency rather than conscious design. This article explores a key facet
of that historical contingency: the role of railroads as owners of large tracts
of heavily timbered lands interspersed with public and other private lands in
bringing about modern federal forest management policies and laws. The
article begins in Section Two by outlining the extent to which a tradition of
free resources permeated federal land policy and its often-lax
administration, using Garret Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” model as
its framework. Then, Section Three explores the ironic role of railroad
companies in confronting the tradition of free resources, even though they
were prime beneficiaries of it. Focusing primarily on the two largest
railroad owners of timber, the Southern Pacific (largely through its
subsidiary Oregon & California) and the Northern Pacific, it shows how
these powerful corporations contributed to the demise of “open access”
resources by enforcing their “right of exclusion,” a right attending
ownership, even as they faced an uncertain legal terrain along the way.
This was a necessary precondition for any effort at landscape-level land
management and conservation—whether public or private. Finally, Section
Four shows how policymakers—first within the Departments of Interior and
Agriculture, then within Congress—recognized the need to follow the lead
of railroads in restricting access to certain areas of the public domain. It
was only after the government established its own “right of exclusion”
through the establishment of forest reserves that management of such lands
using conservationist principles became feasible, both practically and
politically.

10. Id. at 18. This constituted almost one-tenth of the public domain as of 1850, when the
extent of the public domain was at its peak and when the first railroad land grant was made. Id. at
21-22.
11. Roy E. Appleman, Timber Empire from the Public Domain, 26 MISS. VALLEY HIST.
REV. 205, 207 (1939).
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II. THE TRAGEDY OF OPEN ACCESS TIMBER
Lumber entrepreneurs Andrew B. Hammond and his business partner
Richard Eddy had already cut most of the merchantable timber along the
Clark Fork River in the mountains between Missoula and Helena, Montana
by the summer of 1885, when their company, the Montana Improvement
Company, established a new sawmill on the river to process timber from the
tributary Cramer Gulch.12 Having arrived in Missoula just fifteen years
earlier, Hammond had helped build Missoula into a “thriving city of five
thousand” while also building himself into one of the state’s wealthiest, and
hence, most powerful people.13 Hammond and Eddy, along with E.L.
Bonner, formed a merchandising firm in Missoula nine years earlier, and in
1881, that company entered into a contract to supply the Northern Pacific
with lumber for ties and other materials, despite the company lacking
construction experience. Just a year later, in 1882, Hammond, Eddy, and
Bonner joined with Montana copper magnate Marcus Daly and Washington
Dunn, the Northern Pacific’s superintendent of construction, to form the
Montana Improvement Company.14 Because Dunn and other Northern
Pacific officials held a bare majority of the shares, people thought of the
company as a Northern Pacific subsidiary, though nobody was acting in that
company’s interests.15 Upon its creation, the Montana Improvement
Company received a twenty-year contract to supply the railroad’s lumber
needs for construction and maintenance of the railway from Miles City,
Montana to The Dalles, Oregon.16
When Hammond and Eddy arrived at their new Cramer Gulch mill in
the fall of 1885, however, they were surprised to encounter some fifty
loggers, all employees of rival Bill Thompson, on the site cutting down
trees.17 Fights ensued, but ownership of the timber remained unresolved.
As the situation worsened, the parties even violated the custom of
respecting at least the rights of others to trees properly branded.18 They
eventually reached a compromise to honor that custom, but with neither
having the exclusive rights to any unbranded timber.19 It thus became a

12. Gregory Gordon, Money Does Grow on Trees 172-74 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Montana).
13. Id. at 21.
14. Id. at 189.
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 172.
18. As historian Gregory Gordon summarized the situation, “[w]ith no clear-cut demarcation
of ownership, total mayhem broke out.” Id. at 173.
19. Id.
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race as to who could log the fastest.20 As a result, “there were few gulches
in Montana,” historian Gregory Gordon has concluded, “which were
stripped of their timber faster than was Cramer Gulch that winter [of
1886].”21
A. “TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS” EXPLAINED
The above story exemplifies what economist Garrett Hardin labeled the
“tragedy of the commons.”22 Wherever there is lacking an ownership
system that functions to limit access to and consumption of a given
resource, Hardin wrote in his influential 1968 essay, each member of the
community is “locked into a system that compels him to increase his
[consumption of the resource] without limit—in a world that is limited.
Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own
best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.”23
Some have mistakenly explained the tragedy as the failure for individuals to
see community interests over their own self-interests.24 No, the story is a
tragedy rather than merely an unfortunate occurrence because even when an
individual recognizes the “ruin” towards which the community is headed,
and even if that individual values community interests, that person will still
over-exploit the resource absent some coercive mechanism to restrict the
access of others. The reason is that if he were to forego exploitation based
on concern for long-term sustainability, he knows that others will still
20. Id. at 173-74.
21. Id. at 174 (internal citation omitted). Gordon rightly pointed to this story, which
repeated itself across the Northwest, as representing the battle among the federal government,
private capital, and local residents over natural resources, but Gordon wrongfully pointed to it as
an example of the right to access. Really, neither contested the other’s right to access because
neither had the right to exclude—and it was that right which was crucial.
22. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
23. Id. at 1244. In economic terms, the “tragedy” is an example of a market failure. As
Arthur McEvoy described the failure, “[i]n a competitive economy, no market mechanism
ordinarily exists to reward individual forbearance in the use of shared resources.” ARTHUR F.
MCEVOY, THE FISHERMAN’S PROBLEM: ECOLOGY AND LAW IN THE CALIFORNIA FISHERIES,
1850-1980 10 (1990).
24. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Environmental Markets and Beyond: Three Modest
Proposals for the Future of Environmental Law, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 245, 250 (2001) (arguing that
Hardin’s tragedy results “because each individual is only concerned about the potential for selfish
gain from the additional cow and pays no attention to the potential disaster looming for the
community as a whole”); E. Donald Elliott, The Tragi-Comedy of the Commons: Evolutionary
Biology, Economics and Environmental Law, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 17, 17 (2001) (criticizing
Hardin’s apparent view of humans as “narrow-minded and selfish”); Lee Anne Fennell, Common
Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 915 (2004) (conceptualizing the tragedy as “the
resource-appropriator . . . not taking all the costs of her appropriation into account”); Michael Ilg,
Environmental Harm and Dilemmas of Self-Interest: Does International Law Exhibit Collective
Learning?, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 59, 62 (2004) (using Hardin’s model as an explanation for how
“individual perceptions of interest rarely result in decisions that are most beneficial to the
whole . . . .”).
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over-exploit the resource, causing him to suffer along with everyone else
but without the incremental benefit he would have derived from having
fully exploited the resource. The only rational choice is to get what he can
before the others do, even if it destroys the resource. Hardin proffered two
solutions to the “tragedy”: to restrict access through the vigilance of the
community as a whole—“mutual coercion mutually agreed upon”—or to
privatize the resource so that each private owner has the capacity to exclude
others.25
What Hardin labeled a “tragedy of the commons” was really a tragedy
of open-access resources, of non-property, or of an unregulated commons.
In the Anglo-American common law tradition, the terms “commons” or
“common property,” on their own, normally imply some form of communal
control over access and use.26 In short, they embody precisely the “mutual
coercion” that Hardin pointed to as the solution to the tragedy—not the
tragedy itself. For example, beginning as early as the seventh century,
settlements in what is now England employed a system of common fields,
meadows, and pastures, all with limitations on use. After the Norman
Conquest in 1066, communities increasingly regulated who had access to
certain lands and the manner of their use, including the enactment of quotas
on the amount of livestock allowed to graze on a given pasture.27 Much
later, English colonists exported such customs to communities from New
Brunswick to Virginia.28 By the nineteenth century, however, many
Americans had come to view the “commons” differently, and in conflating
“commons” with “open-access,” Hardin unwittingly aligned himself with
nineteenth century American thinking.29
B. CUSTOM OF FREE LAND, FREE TIMBER
Hammond, Eddy, Thompson and others all across the American West
largely viewed timber as an open-access resource—at least prior to the
government privatizing it. The notion of public timber being free for the
taking was not just one of extra-legal, local custom; it had its defenders in

25. Hardin, supra note 22, at 1247.
26. See DANIEL H. COLE, POLLUTION AND PROPERTY: COMPARING OWNERSHIP
INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 11 (2002); Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-Dimensional
Framework for Analyzing Property Rights Regimes, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 813, 816-17 (2003);
Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 U.
COLO. L. REV. 533, 533 (2007).
27. Lynda L. Butler, The Commons Concept: An Historical Concept with Modern
Relevance, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 835, 853-54 (1982); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land,
102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1388-90 (1993).
28. Butler, supra note 27, at 867-75.
29. See generally Hardin, supra note 22.
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Congress as well. For some in Congress, open-access was even an
important component of the American constitutional tradition: exclusion
was for monarchies, open access for democracies. In 1826, for instance,
Senator Thomas Hart Benton admonished his fellow senators that they were
“an assembly of legislators” rather than “keeper[s] of the King’s forests.”30
As representatives of the people, surely they all understood, Benton
implored, that “the public lands belong to the People, and not to the Federal
Government; who know that the lands are to be ‘disposed of’ for the
common good of all, and not kept for the service of a few.”31 Then, in
1852, when agents of the General Land Office (“GLO”), the agency
charged with administering federal public lands, seized timber illegally cut
from public lands in Wisconsin, a representative from that state, Ben
Eastman, insisted that the agents were acting “without the least authority of
law.”32 He even complained that lumbermen had been “harassed almost
beyond endurance with pretended seizures and suits, prosecutions and
indictments until they have been driven almost to the desperation of an
open revolt against their persecutors.”33
That same year, Representative Galusha Grow, from Pennsylvania,
defended the rights of every person to share in the federal government’s
supply of timber:
[W]hatever nature has provided . . . belongs alike to the whole
race, and each may, of right, appropriate to his own use so much as
is necessary to supply his rational wants. And as the means of
sustaining life are derived almost entirely from the soil, every
person has a right to so much of the earth’s surface as is necessary
for his support . . . . As it is man’s labor, then, applied to the soil
that gives him a right to his improvements . . . so he is entitled to a
reasonable quantity of wood-land, it being necessary to the full
enjoyment of his improvements; for wood is necessary for
building purposes, fencing, and fire-wood. Therefore, he becomes
entitled out of this common fund to a reasonable amount of
wood-land.34
As these quotes demonstrate, Americans viewed more than just timber
as an open-access resource. As Greeley once remarked, “free timber” was
merely one part of the American “free land” tradition represented in the

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

19 CONG. REC. 727 (1826) (statement of Sen. Thomas Benton).
Id.
Gordon, supra note 12, at 183.
See id.
CONG. GLOBE APPENDIX, 32D CONG., 1ST SESS. 426 (1852).
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preemption and homestead laws.35 Preemption laws, the most significant of
which Congress passed in 1841, provided for qualified persons to acquire
legal title for up to 160 acres by inhabiting and improving the land and
paying $1.25 per acre.36 The law applied retroactively to validate the
claims of people who had previously settled land, even without legal right.37
Passed in 1862, the Homestead Act expanded upon the preemption laws by
providing settlers the option of securing lands for free simply by living on
the land for five years and cultivating it.38 Greeley might have added to that
list of laws the nation’s mining laws—which declared public lands to be
“free and open” to mineral exploration and development—and its lack of
restrictions on the use of public rangelands.39 As late as 1884, a
congressional committee charged with reviewing the nation’s land laws
found cattlemen to be illegally holding roughly fifteen million acres of the
public domain, yet it also acknowledged the government lacked any legal
mechanism for prosecuting the trespasses.40 Indeed, the term “public
lands” itself came to be understood not as those lands in governmental
ownership, but only as those lands free and open for the American public to
enter and to acquire.41
C. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S INADEQUATE EFFORT TO
CONTROL DEPREDATIONS
To a limited extent, the government did assert control of resources
prior to privatization. It dictated who could have access to what resources
and defined the conditions by which parcels could be privatized, even if
such conditions were minimal. The Preemption Act of 1841, for example,
allowed only heads of families, widows, or single men to settle lands and

35. See Robert Bunting, Abundance and the Forests of the Douglas-Fir Bioregion, 18401920, 18 ENVTL. HIST. REV. 41, 45 (1994). In 1807, Congress passed an act “[t]o prevent
settlements being made on lands ceded to the United States, until authorized by law.” Act of
March 3, 1807, 2 Stat. 445. However, the Preemption Law of 1841 recognized the rights of those
who had settled (or squatted) on government land, even in violation of law. Preemption Act of
1841, 5 Stat. 453.
36. Id. at § 9.
37. Id. at § 10.
38. Homestead Act of 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-64, § 2, 12 Stat. 392.
39. Act of May 10, 1872, 17 Stat. 91.
40. See generally Joseph Arthur Miller, Congress and the Origins of Conservation: Natural
Resource Policies, 1865-1900 203 (1973) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of
Minnesota). The government could have brought civil actions under a common law trespass
theory, but that would have required the government to describe the affected lands to a level of
specificity that would have been nearly impossible.
41. For a discussion of the defense of free timber in Congress, at least for the purposes of
settlement, see PAUL WALLACE GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 538-40
(1968).
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ultimately secure legal title, and it limited the size of tracts to 160 acres.42
It also required settlers to follow several steps. After inhabiting and
improving particular parcels, qualified settlers had thirty days to file a
declaration of intent to preempt, and they had a year to prove the settlement
and improvement, to submit an affidavit testifying that they met all of the
requirements of the act, and to pay $1.25 per acre.43 However, from the
start, these restrictions were frequently violated, sometimes with the
backing of extra-legal, vigilante organizations known informally as “claim
clubs.”44
Such a development was foreseeable. In the debates over the
preemption law in 1841, in fact, Senator Henry Clay predicted that the
federal government would not be able to control the lawless rabble that he
said would settle lands ahead of surveys. Clay’s warning, however, went
unheeded, and at great expense. Thirty years later, Henry George lamented
the extent to which speculators had exploited the land laws to benefit
themselves at the expense of the public:
A generation hence our children will look with astonishment at the
recklessness with which the public domain has been squandered.
It will seem to them that we must have been mad . . . to every
importunate beggar to whom we would have refused money we
have given land—that is, we have given to him or to them the
privilege of taxing the people who alone would put this land to any
use.45
The Homestead law contained similar restrictions and requirements,
but they too were often circumvented.46 One prominent public lands
historian has written that speculation and land monopolization—in part
executed via fraudulent homestead entries—characterized the homesteading
era, with “actual homesteading [being] generally confined to the less
desirable lands distant from railroad lines.”47 Commissioner of the GLO,
William A. J. Sparks, complained in 1885 that the Homestead Act, “both in
Washington and in the field, was frequently in the hands of persons
unsympathetic to its principle” and that “Western interests, though lauding

42. The Preemption Act of 1841, 5 Stat. 453.
43. Id.
44. See generally Kammer, supra note 7, at 310.
45. HENRY GEORGE, OUR LAND AND LAND POLICY, NATIONAL AND STATE 10 (1871). His
work was instrumental in ending the railroad land grant era. But much of the actual privatization
of land under the land grants was still in the future, subject to legal interpretation, of course.
46. Act of May 20, 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-64, 12 Stat. 392.
47. Paul Wallace Gates, The Homestead Law in an Incongruous Land System, 41 AM. HIST.
REV. 652, 655 (1936).
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the act, were ever ready to pervert it.”48 In his memoir, Pinchot described
one method for circumventing the Homestead Act’s requirements:
The law required a dwelling on a homestead claim. So the
claimant would build a toy house, swear to the existence of a
dwelling on his claim ‘14 by 16 in size,’ but omit to mention that
the said dwelling was 14 by 16 inches instead of 14 by 16 feet.49
The federal government also passed laws prohibiting the unauthorized
taking of timber from public lands. Congress enacted the first in 1817,
when it allowed the Secretary of Navy to reserve timberlands for
shipbuilding and enacted penalties for the unauthorized taking of timber
from such forests.50 Then, in 1831, Congress expanded the prohibition to
all public lands.51 These pieces of legislation, however, went largely
unenforced. The GLO only began prosecuting timber trespass in 1852.52
Even then, the government’s prosecutions were sporadic, and its policies
focused not on preventing illegal timber harvests, but rather merely on
ensuring the government received the value of the trees illegally cut.
Commissioner of the GLO, Willis Drummond, reported to Congress in
1873, for instance, that when registers and receivers obtained reliable
information that “spoliation of public timber is committed, their instructions
require them to investigate the matter, to seize all timber found to have been
cut without authority on the public land, to sell the same to the highest
bidder at public auction, and deposit the proceeds in the Treasury.”53 While
Drummond increased prosecutions, he emphasized that their purpose was
“not to indulge in vindictive prosecutions.”54 Instead, he advised
prosecutors “to compromise with the parties” to pay only a reasonable price
for the stumpage plus the government’s costs in bringing suit.55 By merely
fining trespassers for the value of the timber taken, the federal government
ignored the negative impact of the timber harvest on the land’s future
productivity. This is why Hurst saw this approach as yet another example
of the legal system’s preference for present over future yield, a preference
that resulted from the perceived abundance of land and resources and
48. Id. at 655-56.
49. GIFFORD PINCHOT, BREAKING NEW GROUND 81 (rev. ed. 1987).
50. Gordon, supra note 12, at 181.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 182-185.
53. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GEN. LAND OFFICE 13
(1873).
54. Id.
55. Id. See also GATES, supra note 41, at 545-57 (discussing federal policies towards
protecting federal timber from 1873 to 1885, when the Cleveland Administration reformed the
Land Department and more aggressively acted to protect the public domain from depredations).
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perceived shortage of capital.56 It also contributed to countless timber
“tragedies,” at least on the local scale, as Hurst’s history of the Wisconsin
lumber industry demonstrates.57
III. THE ROLE OF RAILROADS IN COMBATING TRAGEDY
Railroads initially exacerbated such tragedies by creating demand for
timber and by linking timber to distant markets. They stimulated timber
demand both because they required timber for railroad construction and
because they made industrial-scale mining—requiring large amounts of
timber—feasible. In the Missoula Valley for instance, sawmills remained
small-scale water-powered mills, intended only to supply lumber for
immediate local consumption, until the arrival of the Northern Pacific,
when railroad contracts allowed Hammond and others to build dozens of
steam-powered mills to supply railroad construction and the burgeoning
mining industry such railroads made possible.58 Railroads also participated,
typically through “improvement company” subsidiaries, in the trespasses
themselves, as the Northern Pacific’s relationship with Hammond’s
Montana Improvement Company exemplifies.59
However, railroads can also be seen as having helped save American
forests from tragedy, at least on a national scale. Environmental historian
Robert Bunting, for one, has argued that the acquisition of extensive timber
holdings by powerful corporations like the Northern Pacific led to a decline
in timber trespasses in the Pacific Northwest.60 One reason is that railroads
possessed the motivation to enforce rights as to which the government had
long been indifferent: the right to exclude others. The Supreme Court has
referred to this right as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property.”61 The right to exclude
56. See James A. Lake, Sr., Law and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the Lumber
Industry in Wisconsin, 1836-1915, 17 ME. L. REV. 298 (1964) (reviewing JAMES W. HURST, LAW
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1964)) (explaining that railroad land grants were also a manifestation
of this preference).
57. See id.
58. Gordon, supra note 12, at 181-82.
59. John B. Rae, Commissioner Sparks and the Railroad Land Grants, 25 MISS. VALLEY
HIST. REV. 211, 217 (1938) (labeling the Northern Pacific as apparently “the worst offender”).
60. Bunting, supra note 35, at 41.
61. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). Writing for the majority in a 1979 case, Justice Rehnquist went
even further in concluding that the right to exclude was not only the most important component of
property, but “fundamental” to it. Kaiser, 444 U.S. at 179-80. Legal scholars have largely agreed,
arguing that “the right to exclude others is a necessary and sufficient condition of identifying the
existence of property,” such that the right to exclude is “fundamental to the concept of property”
itself, and concluding that “property means the right to exclude others from valued resources, no
more and no less.” Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730,
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is indeed the reason that Hardin advocated privatization as one of the two
solutions to the tragedy of the commons.62
Whereas the federal
government, at least until the latter part of the nineteenth century, lacked the
combination of will and means to enforce its right of exclusion, railroads
had both a pecuniary incentive to protect their resources and staffs of
investigators and attorneys to do so.
A. ESTABLISHING A RIGHT OF EXCLUSION
That railroads were both willing and able to enforce their rights of
exclusion is perhaps best demonstrated by the great number of land contests
and ejectment actions—both legal mechanisms for enforcing an
exclusionary right—railroads initiated. Railroads became embroiled in
litigation over the nature and extent of their rights to particular tracts of land
as against the rights of preemptors, homesteaders, mining claimants,
Indians, federal and state governments, and other railroads. Indeed, no
public lands legislation produced more litigation than railroad land grants.
The Northern Pacific, on its own, was a party to over three-thousand formal
legal disputes involving its land grant.63
The approach of another railroad, the Oregon & California, was
typical. Upon having a selection list approved and receiving patents to
sections of land, the company first made its possession of lands clear to all
would-be settlers, both by recording its patents in the various counties in
which the lands lay and by keeping on record its approved selection lists
and patents issued by the government. The company also established its
ownership by paying taxes on such lands.64 When the company found a
party occupying a parcel of its unsold lands, it sent agents to ascertain the
755 (1998). James E. Penner, in THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW, argued that “the right to
property is a right to exclude others from things which is grounded by the interest we have in the
use of things.” JAMES E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (1997). While the right is
grounded in the owner’s use of the thing, “the law of property is driven by an analysis which takes
the perspective of exclusion, rather than one which elaborates a right to use.” Id. But see, Jerry L.
Anderson, Comparative Perspectives on Property Rights: The Right to Exclude, 56 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 539, 541 (2006) (questioning the essentialness of exclusion by pointing to property regimes
outside of the English common law tradition that have implemented property regimes that
incorporate public rights of access).
62. Of course, private property holders can also over-exploit a resource, especially in
situations where their individual fortunes are not tied to the sustainability of either that resource or
the local communities dependent upon it. For instance, lumbermen could over-exploit the forests
of the upper Great Lake region because they knew more timber was available in the Pacific
Northwest, such that their fortunes were not tied to Great Lakes timber or to the local communities
built up to exploit it.
63. Docket, 1885-1899, Northern Pacific Railway Co. Records, Land Dep’t Records, Land
Cases, Box 136.G.14.8F, Minnesota Historical Society, Saint Paul, MN.
64. Transcript of Record at 2202, Or. & Cal. Ry. v. United States, 238 U.S. 393 (1916) (No.
492).
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situation and to determine the rights, if any, of the possible trespassers to
the land. If the person was indeed without legal right to occupy the land,
the company asserted its ownership and demanded that the party either take
a lease on the land or vacate it. If the individual refused, the company then
filed an ejectment suit to force them from the land.65 The company also
took efforts to prevent depredations, destruction, or waste of timber by
persons not entitled to it by law.66
In the case of the Northern Pacific, wherever the company suspected
timber trespasses, the company’s land commissioner sent out an
investigator to gather information as to any past transgressions and to
prevent future transgressions. That person then reported to the land office,
which then referred any prosecutable trespasses to the Western Land
Attorney with a directive to settle for the amount cut. The Northern Pacific
typically demanded a settlement amount far above market value.67 In late
1896, for instance, a Northern Pacific investigator, Charles E. Woodworth,
notified the sheriff of Missoula County, William H. McLaughlin, that he
was responsible for taking timber from Northern Pacific lands. Frank M.
Dudley, the Northern Pacific’s Western Land Attorney in Spokane,
Washington, later followed up with McLaughlin demanding settlement at
$1.50 per thousand board feet unlawfully cut.68 The sheriff responded by
requesting both an extension of time and for the amount to be lowered to
one dollar. As to the need for an extension, he confessed that he was
“unable to pay just now” and needed until May or June of the following
year, the reason being that his lumber mill was seasonal—it had shut down
on October 1 and would not reopen until spring. As for the price
demanded, McLaughlin considered it “out of all reason the way lumber is
selling and was selling when the timber was cut.”69 He stated that he would
be “perfectly willing to pay the going price for timber,” which he estimated
at $1.00 per thousand board feet, based primarily on the price for processed
lumber at the railway car being less than $6.00. He finished with a plea:
“Hoping you will consider the price of timber very carefully.”70 What
65. Id. at 2203. The company made “a good many leases” of lands for grazing purposes,
according to land official Brian A. McAllaster; in many of these cases, the company’s purpose
was to prevent the statute of limitations running against the company by virtue of the occupancy.
Id. at 1980-81.
66. Id. at 2203.
67. See generally Northern Pacific Railway Co. Records, Law Dep’t Records, Land
Litigation Files, Box 1, Folder 22, Minnesota Historical Society, Saint Paul, MN.
68. Letter from McLaughlin to Dudley (December 21, 1896), Northern Pacific Railway Co.
Records, Law Dep’t Records, Land Litigation Files, Box 1, Folder 22, Minnesota Historical
Society, Saint Paul, MN.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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McLaughlin sought, in short, was to pay the market value for the timber
without paying anything for violating the Northern Pacific’s right of
exclusion.
In its reply, the railroad made clear it wanted redress not just for the
value of the timber taken, but also for being deprived its right of exclusion.
First, Dudley forwarded McLaughlin’s letter to Land Commissioner
William H. Phipps with a request for instructions on how to proceed. In
reply, Phipps acknowledged the rate of $1.50 per thousand board feet to be
high, but he emphasized that such was intentional: he sought “to make it
unprofitable for people to cut our timber without authority.”71 Unlike the
federal government, the Northern Pacific recognized that its property rights
entitled it not just to the market value of commodities on the land, but also
to decide how and when they were to be extracted and to determine who
would receive the benefits from such use. Moreover, it perhaps also
recognized that the value of the property was not just in its present value,
but also in its future productivity. Still, Phipps authorized Dudley to settle
for $1.25 per thousand board feet, an amount splitting the difference
between the railroad’s initial demand and McLaughlin’s estimated market
value. As to the extension of time, Phipps thought that was fine, so long as
the railroad received sufficient security.72
B. LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES AS OBSTACLES TO EXCLUSION
Economists understand Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” as an
example of a “market failure,” meaning that the market has failed to
maximize efficiency—an economic term of art essentially serving as a
proxy for “satisfaction” or “enjoyment.”73 Types of market failure include
externalities—i.e., costs or benefits not borne by parties to a transaction—
transaction costs, imperfect competition, and a lack of clearly defined
property rights.74
While the federal government provided for the
privatization of much of its public domain, it left much ambiguity in the
definition of the resulting property rights. This was in part due to the sheer
number of land laws, as Congress passed roughly 3,500 such laws between

71. Letter from Phipps to Dudley (January 2, 1897), Northern Pacific Railway Co. Records,
Law Dep’t Records, Land Litigation Files, Box 1, Folder 22, Minnesota Historical Society, Saint
Paul, MN.
72. Id.
73. For a good discussion of the tragedy as an example of a market failure, see JAN G.
LAITOS, SANDI B. ZELLMER & MARY C. WOOD, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW, 18-21 (2d ed.
2012).
74. Id.
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1785 and 1880.75 It was not just the immense number of laws passed,
however, but also their lack of precision and consistency as to the rights of
grantees that led to confusion. The nation’s land laws, in historian Paul
Wallace Gates’ summation, created an incongruous land system, one with
sometimes dire consequences for those caught within it.76 Indeed, in 1887,
Secretary of the Interior Lucious Q. C. Lamar expressed pity for settlers
who could “scarcely find a desirable location that was not claimed by some
one, or perhaps two or three, of the many roads to which grants of land had
been made by Congress.”77
Railroad land grants, even on their own, were highly complex and
difficult to administer. First, railroads typically received only alternating
sections of land, creating a “checkerboard” of sorts across the American
landscape. While this may seem simple, delays in cadastral surveys
allowed for conflicting claims to arise and for property rights to remain
unsettled.78 Second, land grants typically excepted lands containing
minerals other than coal or iron from grants. This too may seem simple but,
in fact, led to uncertainties due to long delays in physical surveys.79
Finally, Congress did not actually grant any land but rather provided the
procedures by which railroads could acquire the designated lands. There
were multiple steps involved. The first was for the grant recipients to file
maps of the projected general routes of their roads with the Department of
Interior, after which the president was directed to have the lands along such
routes surveyed.80 Most also contained provisions directing the GLO, upon
general location, to withdraw granted lands from disposal under the public
land laws.81 Then, as each portion of the prescribed railway was built,
recipient railway companies filed maps of definite location showing the
precise line of the constructed railway.82
At that point, Congress expected that railroad companies would file
selection lists, and the appropriate lands would be patented to the railroad
companies to be sold to the general public to great benefit.83 Congress also

75. Vernon Carstensen, Introduction to THE PUBLIC LANDS: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF
xxii (Carstensen ed. 1963).
76. See generally GATES, supra note 41.
77. David M. Ellis, The Forfeiture of Railroad Land Grants, 1867-1894, 33 MISS. VALLEY
HIST. REV. 27, 33 (1946).
78. See infra text accompanying note 94.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 94-101.
80. Act of July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. 369.
81. Id.; Act of July 25, 1866, 14 Stat. 239; Act of May 4, 1870, 16 Stat. 94.
82. Act of May 4, 1870, 16 Stat. 94.
83. See Ellis, supra note 77, at 30.
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anticipated the railways to be completed within ten years.84 In truth, neither
occurred. Both the construction of railways and the subsequent patenting of
lands were delayed for decades. The Northern Pacific, for instance, did not
complete its line from Duluth, Minnesota to Tacoma, Washington until
1887, twenty-three years after it received its grant and a full thirteen years
past its original deadline.85 Further, despite its construction being gradual,
it had patented less than a million acres of its estimated forty-seven million
acre grant by that time.86 While this was probably at least partly due to
railroads delaying their applications for lands so as to avoid paying taxes,87
it was also due to the GLO being overworked.88
Because so much of the land grants remained unpatented for so long,
railroad companies were compelled to develop policies on how to protect
their future interests to land not yet patented to them. All the while, their
legal rights—including their rights of exclusion—remained in a sort of legal
limbo. Indeed, the sheer number of legal disputes involving the Northern
Pacific and other railroads and their claims to land evidences not just a
dedication on their part to enforcing their exclusionary rights, but also a
great deal of legal uncertainty. In short, parties do not expend the time and
money in litigation unless either the facts or the law are uncertain;
otherwise, they would settle.89 Legal uncertainties remained even to the
turn of the century, as indicated below.
1.

The Problem of Too Many Trespassers

Because railroad construction was a primary impetus for timber
trespasses, the Northern Pacific sometimes caught people cutting timber for
the purposes of selling it to another railroad, just as the Northern Pacific
sometimes purchased timber stolen from another’s land. In the spring of
1897, for example, a railroad investigator discovered piles of ties in
multiple locations along the Montana-Idaho border. He soon concluded
that the ties were taken from within the limits of the Northern Pacific’s land
grant and that such ties were earmarked for use on the competing Great
Northern line. Upon the investigator reporting the matter to the Land
Department, Land Commissioner Phipps sought the advice of Dudley, who
84. Id.
85. Leslie E. Decker, The Railroads and the Land Office: Administrative Policy and the
Land Patent Controversy, 1864-1896, 46 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 688, 695 (1960).
86. Id.
87. Transcript of Record, supra note 64, at 2213.
88. See Harold H. Dunham, Some Crucial Years of the General Land Office, 1875-1890, 11
AGRIC. HIST. 117, 118 (1937).
89. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
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directed that the company wait for the Great Northern to inspect and accept
the ties before calling its attention to the Northern Pacific’s claims. 90 The
reason was simple: if the Northern Pacific were to sue prior to the other
railroad’s acceptance, it would have to proceed against each of the
individual trespassers, possibly entangling the company in twenty or more
lawsuits.91 Though not made explicit, that the Great Northern had deeper
pockets then small-scale timber operators likely played a role as well.92
2.

The Problem of Unsurveyed Lands

Another issue confronting the company in this case was that the ties
had been taken from lands not yet surveyed. Because there were not yet
specific parcels of land to which the Northern Pacific could point where its
future interests had been violated, the Northern Pacific could not technically
sue the Great Northern. Rather, that obligation fell to the United States
Department of Justice. As in other cases, the Northern Pacific notified the
U.S. district attorney and solicited his agreement to bring suit for the
trespasses.93 The agreement called for the Northern Pacific to draft the
complaint and otherwise aid in the prosecution; in exchange, the district
attorney agreed to give half of the suit’s proceeds to the company. 94
Lands remaining unsurveyed for so long was especially difficult given
the exclusion of mineral lands from railroad grants.95 The Supreme Court
compounded the uncertainty in 1894 when it held the exclusion of mineral
lands to include those lands unknown to contain minerals at the time of the
route being fixed, so long as minerals were discovered prior to patent.96
That case involved land in western Montana on the outskirts of Helena.
The railroad fixed the definite route through that area in 1882, at which time
nobody knew the land at issue contained minerals. Six years later,
however, a group of four men entered the land without the consent of the
90. Letter from Dudley to Phipps (March 2, 1897), Northern Pacific Railway Co. Records,
Law Dep’t Records, Land Litigation Files, Box 1, Folder 22, Minnesota Historical Society, Saint
Paul, MN.
91. Id.
92. In another case, an alleged trespasser claimed not to have any money at all, insisting that
he would have shut down if he could afford to buy off his five employees. Letter from
Woodworth to Wilsey (March 4, 1897), Northern Pacific Railway Co. Records, Law Dep’t
Records, Land Litigation Files, Box 1, Folder 22, Minnesota Historical Society, Saint Paul, MN.
93. Letter from Dudley to Phipps (April 16, 1897), Northern Pacific Railway Co. Records,
Law Dep’t Records, Land Litigation Files, Box 1, Folder 22, Minnesota Historical Society, Saint
Paul, MN.
94. Id.
95. From the perspective of the Northern Pacific, the exclusion of minerals can be seen as an
exercise of the government’s right of exclusion, but this was only to keep minerals free and open
to entry by the general public.
96. See Barden v. N. Pac. R. Co., 154 U.S. 288, 321 (1894).
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railroad and located quartz lode mining claims on it. They subsequently
discovered gold, silver, and other precious minerals on their claims. The
Northern Pacific then asserted its right of exclusion by filing a complaint in
federal court for the recovery of the possession of the land, for the value of
minerals extracted, and for the costs associated with the litigation.97 The
railroad’s attorneys insisted that the grant’s exclusion of mineral lands
applied only to those known to contain minerals as of the date of definite
location or to those the railroad identified as mineral in its definite location.
Writing for the Supreme Court’s majority, Justice Stephen Field
rejected the railroad’s argument. He first made a formalistic statutory
construction argument. He reasoned that the company’s position amounted
to adding the word “known” into the statute, something he was unwilling to
do. As he interpreted the plain meaning of the land grant, “the intention of
[C]ongress was to exclude from the grant actual mineral lands, whether
known or unknown, and not merely such as were at the time known to be
mineral.”98 Field then offered an additional rationalization for his opinion,
this one relating to the policies behind the land grants. He first noted that
when Congress passed the land grant, it was impossible to know what parts
of the vast tract contained minerals; rather, the mineral character of lands
“could only be ascertained after extensive and careful explorations.”99 He
then surmised:
“it is not reasonable to suppose that Congress would have left that
important fact [as to the mineral character of the lands] dependent
upon the simple designation by the [Northern Pacific] of the line
of its road, and the possible disclosure of minerals by the way,
instead of leaving it to future and special explorations for their
discovery.”100
Such a reading of the statute, according to Field, would amount to an
imputation to Congress that it intended its exclusion of minerals to be
defeated, something that Field found “impossible to admit.”101 To Field,
those “future and special explorations” were to take place as part of the
GLO’s investigation prior to issuing patents. Once the government issued
patents to the railroad, they were final and determinative absent fraud.102
The Court’s holding had the practical effect of calling into question the
right of exclusion of railroad land grant recipients, including the Northern
97. Id. at 293
98. Id. at 316.
99. Id. at 319
100. Id. at 318.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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Pacific, prior to patent, at least as to those entering lands to explore for
minerals. That was especially the case given that private entry and
exploration was still the primary legal mechanism for the government to
identify which lands contained minerals, and hence which lands were
excluded from railroad land grants. At the very least, railroads could no
longer eject an alleged “trespasser” once a discovery of minerals had been
made. Since many years, if not decades, typically passed between the
definite location of the railway’s route and patenting, this was quite a
troubling development for the Northern Pacific and other land grant
railroads.
Another problem was that the GLO had neither the means nor the
explicit legal authority to investigate lands as to their mineral character—as
the Court seemingly assumed it did—prior to issuing patents. The Court’s
opinion spurred Congress to action, however, as not even a year passed
before Congress, in early 1895, directed the president to appoint three
commissioners for each of four designated districts in western Montana and
Idaho.
Congress directed such commissioners, once appointed, to
classify—based on personal examinations and the taking of
affidavits—lands within the limits of the Northern Pacific grant as to their
mineral character. Further, Congress showed real urgency in providing
actual money to fund the enterprise and in directing the commissioners to
begin immediately upon their appointment.103 There would be no waiting
for the Northern Pacific to file its selection lists.
3.

The Problem of Possession (for Subsequent Purchasers)

Purchasers of land from the railroads also faced legal obstacles in an
uncertain legal environment. Railroad companies typically sold land by
contracts under which several years might pass before actual titles changed
hands. Under American law at the time, this posed a problem; namely, that
to maintain an ejectment suit, persons were required to show that they had
“a valuable and subsisting interest and immediate right to the
possession.”104 Because persons under contract to purchase lands from the
railroad did not receive title until fulfilling the terms of their contract, they
arguably lacked the “immediate right to possession” necessary to exercise
any exclusionary right in court.

103. Act of Feb. 26, 1895, 28 Stat. 683.
104. Letter from Gose & Kuykendall to Stephens (March 1902), Northern Pacific Railway
Co. Records, Law Dep’t Records, Land Litigation Files, Box 1, Folder 15, Minnesota Historical
Society, Saint Paul, MN.
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John H. Jackson encountered this issue. On Christmas Eve 1898,
Jackson contracted for the purchase of Northern Pacific land in southeast
Washington near the town of Pomeroy.105 Almost four years later, he
sought to eject someone from the property who had been occupying it with
a claim of ownership, but he could not do so because his contract with the
Northern Pacific, like all others, was silent as to possession. Accordingly,
his attorneys from Pomeroy wrote to the railroad’s land department
requesting that a company official sign a document confirming that the
contract indeed entitled Jackson to possession of the land from the date of
its execution.106 Assistant Land Commissioner F. W. Wilsey refused,
stating his understanding that the railroad did not in fact “place purchasers
of its lands in possession thereof,” but rather made possession contingent
upon all of the conditions included in the contracts.107 He thus advised the
attorneys to take the matter up with the company’s division counsel in
Spokane, H. M. Stephens. They did just that.108 Luckily for Jackson,
Stephens disagreed with Wilsey’s interpretation and did not object to
signing the instrument attached. He forwarded the letter to Kerr to confirm,
and Kerr agreed. Kerr then asked Land Commissioner Phipps to sign the
instrument.109 At least one problem was solved.
4.

The “Problem” of the Duty to Exclude

In some instances, railroad attorneys sought to maintain some level of
legal uncertainty, lest issues be resolved against their client’s interests. One
example of this phenomenon dealt with the doctrine of adverse possession.
This doctrine holds that where a deed holder allows another to possess its
land in an actual, hostile, exclusive, and continuous fashion, under a claim
of right, and for some requisite period, the deed holder loses the right to
eject the trespasser.110 It is, in essence, a duty of exclusion. Given that the
105. The tract was just north of the Tucannon River in section 5, township 11, range 40 E of
Willamette Meridian.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. There has been some debate as to the historical origins of the modern, American form
of adverse possession, one which arose during the nineteenth century. Traditionally, adverse
possession law was seen as mere application of the statute of frauds to real property disputes, and
this is indeed how attorneys at the turn of the twentieth century saw it. Recently, though, scholars
have begun to emphasize the role of the pro-development ideology that has dominated American
law, politics, and culture. As legal scholar John G. Sprankling argued, “adverse possession
functions to facilitate the economic exploitation of land” and thus “mirrors the historic American
view that forests, wetlands, grasslands, deserts and other lands in natural condition contribute
nothing to the social welfare until they are converted to economic use.” John G. Sprankling, An
Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 840 (1994).
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Northern Pacific acquired its interest in lands over several steps, with
arguably increased property rights at each step, questions were raised, even
as late as the turn of the century, as to the time at which the Northern
Pacific’s duty to exclude adverse uses of its lands attached. This was of
concern not just to the Northern Pacific, but also those who purchased or
were considering purchasing lands from the company.
One such case involved Miles J. Cavanaugh, a miner and a member of
the Mineral Land Classification Commission for the district encompassing
Butte. In the summer of 1899, Cavanaugh purchased a section of land just
to the west of Butte near the mining town of Anaconda, a section he and the
commission had classified as non-mineral in a report approved by the
Commissioner of the GLO the previous summer.111 Prior to Cavanaugh’s
purchase of the property, however, a portion of it—the northeastern
part—had reportedly been enclosed by a fence by someone with the last
name Hays, and before that by someone with the last name McCleary, as
part of what locals knew as the Saw Mill Ranch.112
Early in the spring following his purchase, Cavanaugh began to remove
the fence before receiving a complaint from Hays claiming the tract as his
own. Hays sought an ejectment of Cavanaugh and his employees, accusing
them of having, “without right, unlawfully and without the consent of the
plaintiff, entered upon said premises and trespassed thereon.”113 “Unless
restrained by the order of this Court,” the defendants would, according to
Hays,
enter upon the same and tear down, take away and destroy
plaintiff’s fence enclosing said premises, and may themselves,
their servants, agencys and employes [sic], continually enter and
trespass upon said premises and destroy the said grass and hay,
and will allow stock and cattle to enter and trespass upon the same,
and that if they are permitted to remove or break or tear down or
destroy said fence of any portion thereof, stock and cattle will
continually enter upon the same and tread down said grass and
render said premises worthless to the plaintiff for the purpose of
raising grass or hay thereon.114

111. Letter from William Wallace to James B. Kerr (March 9, 1900), Northern Pacific
Railway Co. Records, Law Dep’t Records, Land Litigation Files, Box 1, Folder 12, Minnesota
Historical Society, Saint Paul, MN.
112. Letter from Edward W. Beattie & Miles J. Cavanaugh to Charles W. Bunn (March 13,
1900), Northern Pacific Railway Co. Records, Law Dep’t Records, Land Litigation Files, Box 1,
Folder 12, Minnesota Historical Society, Saint Paul, MN.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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Neither Hays nor McCleary had received patent from the United States,
neither claimed to have purchased the land from the Northern Pacific,
which had received a patent, and neither claimed to have rights under the
land settlement laws of the United States. Rather, Hays based his claim on
the doctrine of adverse possession.
A Butte law firm of Miles J. Cavanaugh Jr., the defendant’s son, and
Edward W. Beattie, Jr., the surveyor general’s son, represented
Cavanaugh.115 In March 1900, after a judge had ordered a preliminary
injunction against Cavanaugh entering the premises and had scheduled a
court date for trial, the firm wrote to the Northern Pacific’s division
counsel, William Wallace, asking for information and for other assistance in
the defense. The question was important enough for Wallace to forward it
to Assistant General Counsel James B. Kerr. Wallace summarized the
plaintiff’s claim as relying upon “the proposition that the statutes of
limitation begin to run on the definite location of the line and the fixing of
the grant.”116 He also predicted what authority plaintiff’s attorneys would
use as support, all cases from California.117
Wallace initially thought that the Supreme Court had settled this
question in an 1889 case.118 In that case, the Court held that “[w]hile the
title to public land is still in the United States, no adverse possession of it
can, under a statute of limitations, confer a title which will prevail in an
action of ejectment in the courts of the United States against the legal title
under a patent from the United States.”119 He was surprised to have found,
however, that he was unable to locate another similar holding in his
“hurried examination.”120 He hoped that Kerr might have access to some
such decisions “where you can lay your hands on them,” and asked Kerr to
“furnish me with them by return mail.”121

115. See Letter from Beattie & Cavanaugh to Henry Neill (March 5, 1901), Northern Pacific
Railway Co. Records, Law Dep’t Records, Land Litigation Files, Box 1, Folder 12, Minnesota
Historical Society, Saint Paul, MN.
116. Letter from Wallace to Kerr (March 9, 1900), Northern Pacific Railway Co. Records,
Law Dep’t Records, Land Litigation Files, Box 1, Folder 12, Minnesota Historical Society, Saint
Paul, MN.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. Wallace then went on to discuss other case law which he felt inapplicable,
including one case he found “not in point because the adverse claimant was the grantee of one
who afterward became the patentee.” Id.
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Kerr had no definitive answer. As he characterized it, Wallace’s
question was “a very difficult one.”122 He cited to one case, from just a few
years earlier, that he thought could potentially support a claim that the
statute of limitations had not begun to run until mineral classification. In
that case, Michigan Lumber Co. v. Rust, the Supreme Court held that legal
title did not pass under the Swamp Land Grant Act until lands were
determined to be swamp.123 Since the Northern Pacific only received title
to lands determined to be non-mineral under the Mineral Classification Act,
he thought the case could be analogous, though he acknowledged “not
[being] satisfied that the case falls within the doctrine of [that Supreme
Court opinion].124
As to whether the Northern Pacific should aid in Cavanaugh’s defense,
Kerr answered in the negative. He reasoned that the issue was “such a
dangerous one that it seems to me it is better to have it undecided than
decided adversely and the common understanding is likely to be that the
statute did not begin to run until the issuance of patent.”125 In other words,
the common understanding was better for the railroad than the great weight
of precedent, and it was best not to risk alerting potential adverse
claimants—as well as the attorneys representing them—to that fact.
Even as Kerr thought it best for the Northern Pacific not to be directly
involved in the lawsuit, he urged Wallace to make it clear that “the
company stands ready at any time to refund to Mr. Cavanaugh the whole or
such portion of the purchase price as he is entitled to receive,” especially
since the portion of land involved is small.126 Kerr also wrote to attorneys
Beattie and Cavanaugh directly to offer them some legal advice. In
particular, he recommended “a strong effort . . . be made to show that the
nature of the possession of McCleary and Hays was not such a nature as to
come within the statute.” He also summarized his understanding of the law
regarding when the statute of limitations began to run. After recounting
that the Supreme Court’s prior decisions had “uniformly been to the effect
that on definite location the full legal and beneficial title to land in the place
limits passed to the company,” he surmised that the Mineral Classification
Act may cast some doubt upon that issue, again citing to Michigan Lumber
122. Letter from Kerr to Wallace (March 17, 1900), Northern Pacific Railway Co. Records,
Law Dep’t Records, Land Litigation Files, Box 1, Folder 12, Minnesota Historical Society, Saint
Paul, MN.
123. See generally Mich. Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U.S. 589 (1897).
124. Letter from Kerr to Wallace (March 17, 1900), Northern Pacific Railway Co. Records,
Law Dep’t Records, Land Litigation Files, Box 1, Folder 12, Minnesota Historical Society, Saint
Paul, MN.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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Co. v. Rust. Kerr hoped such “authority may be of some assistance to
[Beattie and Cavanaugh].”127
The Northern Pacific’s legal department encountered the same issue a
few years later in 1903, and the issue’s resolution remained uncertain. One
party, E.C. Pace, from Whitehall, Montana, wrote to Assistant Land
Commissioner Wilsey asking two deceptively simple questions: (1) does
the statute of limitations run against the Northern Pacific as it does against
an individual, and (2) does it begin to run on the date of patent issuance, on
the date of definite location, or on the date of filing of maps of definite
location with the land office? Pace also desired any Supreme Court
opinions on the issue.128 Wilsey forwarded the letter to Land Attorney J. B.
McNamee, who replied to Pace that his questions “cover so much ground
that a complete answer to them would be equivalent to writing a brief on
the subject.” Moreover, McNamee claimed that such a brief “would be
unsatisfactory to [Pace] because of the impossibility of foreseeing just how
the question will arise as to a given tract of land.” Like Kerr, he did not
want “to pass on the general question, as the answer might prove
misleading.”129
IV. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CHANGES COURSE
Railroads also contributed to the avoidance of tragedy by making it so
that policymakers could no longer ignore the problem. By accelerating the
demand for timber and other resources, railroads sparked concerns about
timber famine, thereby precipitating a paradigm shift in how the
government approached both its forests and its public domain more broadly.
First, in the 1880s, the GLO began to police the public domain much more
aggressively, including against trespasses. Then, in the 1890s, Congress
shifted policies from one of disposing of its lands as quickly as possible to
retaining and centrally managing certain lands—including the best
remaining forests—in perpetuity.
A. ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS
A major shift in the GLO’s stance towards land and timber
depredations occurred after the election of Grover Cleveland to the
presidency in 1884. During his campaign, Cleveland had specifically

127. Id.
128. Letter from Pace to Wilsey (January 22, 1903), Northern Pacific Railway Co. Records,
Law Dep’t Records, Land Litigation Files, Box 1, Folder 15, Minnesota Historical Society, Saint
Paul, MN.
129. Id.
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argued for reforms in the GLO to address its acquiescence to rampant
frauds and timber poaching. Upon assuming office, he appointed Lamar as
secretary of Interior and Sparks as commissioner of the GLO, both of whom
already garnered reputations as land reformers. Their appointments spelled
trouble for the lumber interests that had grown dependent upon “free
timber” from the public domain. The administration’s stated policies even
caused Hammond, a fervent Democrat, to switch party allegiances.130
As head of the GLO, Sparks confirmed Hammond’s worst fears.
While he was not the first head of the GLO to seek to clean up the office’s
administration of the public domain, Sparks was more aggressive—and,
hence, more successful—than any of his predecessors. Most notably, he
effected a major shift in the GLO’s approach to timber depredations. When
he first arrived at his post, he found not just a gross indifference among land
officials in the government to protecting the public domain, but actually a
firm belief that the administration lacked the legal authority to prevent or
punish depredations at all. Sparks lamented in his first annual report to
Congress in 1885: “It seems that the prevailing idea running through this
office . . . was that the government had no distinctive rights to be
considered and no special interests to protect . . . .”131 Notions of “free
land” and “free timber” not only pervaded communities of “looters,”132 but
they also influenced those standing guard at the gates.
Sparks committed resources to investigating and prosecuting timber
trespasses. Within his first year, he sent over twenty special agents to
Washington to investigate over a thousand cases of timber trespass
involving the alleged theft of timber worth more than nine million dollars.
This was not just for show, as such investigations led to prosecutions by the
following year.133 Sparks did not just go after minor offenders. In July of
1885, he filed suit against the Northern Pacific and Hammond’s Montana
Improvement Company for their illegal cutting of federal timber in western
Montana.134 Unfortunately, this prosecution would demarcate the limits of
Sparks’ power. In defense, Hammond and other officials claimed that they
130. Gordon, supra note 12, at 195-96.
131. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL
LAND OFFICE 3 (1885). See also GATES, supra note 41, at 557-58. As Lawrence Rakestraw dryly
noted in his 1955 dissertation, “[l]and office agents concerned with timber trespass were few and
inactive; and often the Registers and Receivers of the local land offices were in sympathy with the
depredators.” Lawrence Rakestraw, A History of Forest Conservation in the Pacific Northwest,
1891-1913 6 (1955) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington).
132. This is a term referring to those who benefitted from the federal government’s lax
administration of its public land laws, often through fraud. See generally S.A.D. PUTER &
HORACE STEVENS, LOOTERS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1908).
133. GATES, supra note 41, at 557.
134. Gordon, supra note 12, at 201.
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only took timber from railroad lands—i.e., odd sections—but this seems
implausible given that much of the land remained unsurveyed. They also
claimed that the previous administration, including Secretary of Interior
Henry Teller, had authorized their activities.135 That argument seems
believable, given the laxity of the previous administration’s protection of
the federal domain. Regardless of the merits of the government’s case and
the companies’ defenses, Hammond won victories outside the courtroom.
For example, he was able to rally local support by temporarily closing down
mills and blaming the closures on the government’s suits.136 By the fall of
1886, Sparks had found that it would be difficult to secure witnesses to
testify against the companies, and by 1887, Sparks ran out of money and
had to suspend the investigation.137 This gave Hammond and the other
officials in the Montana Improvement Company an opportunity to insulate
themselves legally from further prosecution.138
From the start, Sparks also committed himself to cleaning up land
office operations, including addressing the rampant frauds that had long
been a feature of public lands administration. The Timber and Stone Act,
which Congress passed in 1878, seemed to invite more fraudulent entries
than any past legislation. That law provided for the sale of California,
Oregon, Nevada, and Washington “timberlands”—defined as lands
“valuable chiefly for timber, but unfit for cultivation”—in 160-acre tracts
for $2.50 per acre.139 Each applicant had to submit an affidavit declaring,
under oath, that the land was primarily valuable for timber, unimproved,
and unfit for cultivation; that the applicant had not previously applied for
land under the act; that the application was not for speculative purposes but
rather “in good faith to appropriate it to his own exclusive use and benefit”;
and that the applicant had not agreed to sell the title to another person or
company.140 In truth, timber companies routinely paid dummy locators to
file applications under the act with the understanding, if not explicit written
agreements, that they would convey the lands to the companies upon
receiving title.141 Indeed, Sparks investigated 2,591 entries made pursuant
to the Act and found 2,223 of them—over eighty-five percent—to have
been fraudulent.142 In response, in 1886, Sparks suspended all entries under
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the Timber and Stone Act and most entries under other land laws in the
western states and territories, where frauds were most prevalent. In
defending his extreme actions, he bluntly pointed to the fact that the “public
domain was being made the prey of unscrupulous speculation and the worst
forms of land monopoly through systematic frauds.”143
Sparks was so aggressive that one Montana paper, in 1885, suggested
that Sparks had preservationist motives. It wrote:
Sparks must be of the opinion that timber is one of the most sacred
products of nature, not to be defiled by the rude hand of man but
intended by God to grow and die and rot, safe from the profanation
of the axeman’s stroke, and that it were sacrilegious to use it for
fuel, building or mining purposes.144
In the West in the 1880s, there was perhaps no greater insult. Though there
is no evidence that Sparks in fact cared about nature per se, his goals
aligned with those of an emerging conservationist movement, the very
movement to which the Montana newspaper sought to link the
commissioner. Beginning in the 1860s, the acceleration in the exploitation
of natural resources, including timber, contributed to a growing awareness
in the United States and elsewhere of the scarcity of resources and of the
need for some sort of rational management of their use. What came to be
known as the conservation movement had many strands: some sought to
ensure a broad segment of the population had access to resources, some
sought to ensure a resource base for future generations, some sought to
preserve the watershed-protection functions of certain forests, particularly
those in the mountains, some sought to protect certain areas for their
aesthetic or recreation value, and yes, some—albeit a far smaller
number—sought to protect nature for nature’s sake. Each of these
“conservationist” goals were impossible to achieve given the broken land
law system and the rampant fraud and theft of public resources, the same
problems Sparks aggressively confronted for his own reasons.
B. STATUTORY REFORM OF PUBLIC LAND LAWS
Sparks’ term as head of the GLO set the stage for great conservationist
victories in Congress in the 1890s. In response to the perceived waste and
destruction of the nation’s forests, as well as the anticipated threat of a
143. Id. at 197-98 (internal citation omitted). See also GATES, supra note 41, at 557-58.
Sparks’ first reporting found that land worth up to $25 for its standing trees was being acquired
under the Timber and Stone Act for $2.50 per acre. It is easy to understand the lengths to which
lumber interests went to avail themselves of the law. Id.
144. Gordon, supra note 12, at 200 (quoting the Butte Semi-Weekly Internmountain,
September 16, 1885)).

116

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90:87

timber famine, Congress, in 1891, passed what Gifford Pinchot later called
“the most important legislation in the history of Forestry in America.”145 In
the legislation that came to be known as “the Forest Reserve Act,” Congress
authorized the president to “[s]et apart and reserve . . . public land bearing
forests . . . or in part covered by timber or undergrowth, whether of
commercial value or not, as public reservations . . . .”146 Pinchot was not
alone in forestry circles in his praise of the Act, which many saw as the first
step towards protecting public timberlands from waste and depredations.147
Soon after it was passed, GLO Commissioner Thomas H. Carter predicted
the Act would “do much in the way of caring for portions of the public
lands bearing forest which it is needful to preserve from spoliation.”148 In
his report to Congress a few months later, Secretary of the Interior John
Noble concurred. He noted that if the law were “prosecuted systematically
and thoroughly, posterity will look upon the action as that to which the
country owes much of its prosperity and safety.”149 Notably, the
legislation—one of the first calling for the conservation or protection of
resources—did not call for any sort of management, but rather was one
simply of excluding others from designated reserves.
Despite the enthusiasm for the Act in the Department of Interior,
Secretary of Interior John W. Noble initially advised that the government
withdraw only those forests “not absolutely required for the legitimate use
and necessities of the residents,” the promotion of settlement, or the
development of natural resources in the immediate vicinity.150 Still, in the
next two years, President Benjamin Harrison, a Republican, designated
fifteen reserves encompassing over thirteen million acres.151 In addition,
while Noble took a conservative view of the qualification of lands for
inclusion in the reserve system, he took a liberal view of what activities
145. PINCHOT, supra note 49, at 85.
146. Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1095. Strikingly, Congress passed the Act “without
question and without debate,” as Pinchot noted. PINCHOT, supra note 49, at 85. The Act was the
twenty-fourth section of a public lands reform bill, inserted into the bill in committee, behind
closed doors. One hundred years after the Act’s passage, prominent public land historian Harold
K. Steen expressed the lament of all historians “that the record is not complete enough to state
with certainty what happened in the conference committee when Section 24 was added.” HAROLD
K. STEEN, THE BEGINNING OF THE NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM 22 (1991).
147. See James Muhn, Early Administration of the Forest Reserve Act: Interior Department
and General Land Office Polities, 1891-1897, FOREST HISTORY SOCIETY (May 14, 2014),
http://www foresthistory.org/Publications/Books/Origins_National_Forests/ .
148. Id. (quoting DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
GENERAL LAND OFFICE FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1890 89-96 (1890)).
149. Id. (quoting DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
GENERAL LAND OFFICE FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1891 I (1891)).
150. See id. (quoting DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, COMPILATION OF PUBLIC TIMBER LAWS
AND REGULATIONS AND DECISIONS THEREUNDER 131 (1897)).
151. HAROLD K. STEEN, THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE: A HISTORY 27-28 (2004).
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were prohibited within the reserves, namely all commercial activities. This
interpretation received great applause from those who had advocated for
forest reserves for aesthetic, preservationist reasons.
Noble’s commitment not to reserve lands desirable for settlement or
development may have been a ploy to gain favor—or at least minimize
dissent—amongst the public. However, it may also have had to do with the
simple fact that neither the GLO, nor the Department of Interior of which it
was a part, had the capacity to enforce the Act’s provisions even to the
lands that still qualified for reservation. While Congress passed legislation
calling for the GLO to exclude others from forest reserves, it failed to
provide any money for the GLO to implement Congress’ directive. The
GLO, already overworked, simply lacked the workforce to take on this new
task. It not only had too few special agents to monitor the reserves, but
these agents also had many other responsibilities, a combination that led to
them only giving “cursory attention” to the reserves.152 In 1893, after
legislators ignored his request for the establishment of a new corps to
supervise the reserves, Secretary of Interior Hoke Smith complained that
the reserves were no better protected than unappropriated, unreserved
lands.153 Smith was right; at the time, the GLO employed only eighty-two
part-time special agents to investigate frauds, timber depredations, illegal
fencing, and other transgressions over the entire public domain consisting
of not just the thirteen million acres of forest reserves, but the entire public
domain exceeding over five-hundred million acres.154 Accordingly, the
secretary determined no new reservations should be created until Congress
gave them the means—both financial and legal—to protect and manage
such reservations.155
In 1894, Smith promulgated regulations calling for the prosecution of
trespasses within the reserves.156 However, Smith still encountered the
same issues as his predecessors: a lack of enforcement power. The
regulations made Smith unpopular in the West. Even the relatively few
prosecutions that Smith instituted were enough to lead western stock and
timber interests to push Congress to open reservations to resource use and
extraction. They also led to legal challenges regarding the validity of the
regulations. In one notable case, ranchers in Oregon insisted the regulation
violated their fundamental rights of open access to the range resource, as
152. Muhn, supra note 147.
153. Id.
154. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL
LAND OFFICE, 1893 77-79 (1893).
155. Muhn, supra note 147.
156. Id.
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well as every other resource, on public lands. The circuit court disagreed,
finding there was “‘no implication of a license to use the [forest reserves] to
the destruction or injury of these forests,’ and reiterated the judicial doctrine
that the federal government had the right to protect its interests against the
threat of trespass and injury.”157 This opinion sparked outrage amongst
cattlemen.
With the government’s right of exclusion legally vindicated, a grand
compromise became feasible. Nobody wanted the reserved forests to go
completely unused, while government officials in the GLO and Interior
recognized a complete ban on entry would be impossible to enforce. In
early 1896, Smith recognized the opportunity to enact a real management
system for federal timberlands, and he asked the National Academy of
Sciences to appoint a commission to study and to advise on the use and
management of the reserves. In his letter to the academy, he exhibited a
sense of urgency, in part due to the time already wasted:
My predecessors in office for the last twenty years have vainly
called attention to the inadequacy and confusion of existing laws
relating to the public timber lands and consequent absence of an
intelligent policy in their administration, resulting in such
conditions as may, if not speedily stopped, prevent a proper
development of a large portion of our country; and because the evil
grows more and more as the years go by, I am impelled to
emphasize the importance of the question by calling upon you for
the opinion and advice of that body of scientists which is officially
empowered to act in such cases as this.158
Smith requested the academy issue the report during that session of
Congress.159 Nearly one year later, at the end of Cleveland’s term, the
committee’s work remained incomplete. However, prior to Cleveland
leaving office, the commission made oral recommendations to Smith’s
successor, Secretary David R. Francis. The oral recommendations included
the establishment of thirteen new reserves encompassing twenty-one
million acres. Cleveland agreed with this recommendation and decided to
issue the order creating the reserves on February 22, George Washington’s
birthday. If the intent was to link forest reserves with the proud American
tradition of representative democracy, it failed. Indeed, echoing Senator
Benton’s statement from decades earlier linking restrictions on access to
157. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Tygh Valley Land and Livestock
Co., 76 F. 693, 695 (1876)).
158. See S. Doc. No. 105, at 7 (1897).
159. STEEN, supra note 151, at 31.
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public resources to monarchism, the Seattle Chamber of Commerce
represented a large segment of Western opposition when it complained
bitterly that even “King George had never attempted so high-handed an
invasion upon [Americans’] rights.”160 Laws can change, but customs die
hard.
Even with strong resistance remaining, Cleveland’s action signaled that
the era of free land and free timber was over, at least as applied to the
remaining federal timberlands. Thus, when President William McKinley
submitted the committee’s full report to Congress in May of 1897, there
was ample support for a compromise measure that would recognize federal
authority over its timberlands while still allowing for use to meet the
existing resource needs of local communities. Within a month, Congress
passed a bill providing for the management of federal timberlands to sustain
the timber resource and to provide watershed protection, while allowing for
timber cutting, mining, and livestock grazing—just the privilege westerners
claimed to possess, though it would no longer be unrestrained or free.161
V. CONCLUSION
Railroad companies were primary beneficiaries of the federal
government’s nineteenth-century policy preference favoring the rapid
disposal of its public domain, for the most part at prices far below market
value, if not for free. Beyond its massive land giveaways, the federal
government also exhibited an indifference to protecting its public domain
for as long as lands remained public. Railroad companies—or, more
accurately, their officials and employees—benefitted from that laxity as
well.
However, railroad land grant recipients also played a key role in
bringing this policy preference to an end. Because these companies had
both a pecuniary interest in protecting their lands from trespasses and theft
and the means to police their massive land holdings, as well as neighboring
federal lands, they confronted and challenged a frontier custom treating all
public resources as free for the taking in ways that the federal government
failed to do. At the same time, because railroads accelerated the rate of
resource exploitation, it also awakened the public to the perils of unfettered
degradation of the nation’s resource base to such a degree that government
officials could no longer ignore the need to reform its land policies. The

160. Id. at 33. See also GATES, supra note 41, at 569.
161. The bill contained two additional compromises to Westerners: it suspended, for one
year, Cleveland’s wildly unpopular Washington’s Birthday Reserves, and it continued to allow
some free use of timber for mining and domestic purposes. Act of June 4, 1897, 30 Stat. 35.
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model of conservation embodied in the Forest Management Act, which still
governs management of the national forests, required not only planning and
restraint on the part of the government, but also the willingness and ability
to exclude others from exploiting the land’s resources. In this regard,
railroads showed the way, even if most policymakers and government
officials were slow to see it.
Still, by the late nineteenth century, the customs of free land, free
minerals, and free timber had become too entrenched to be fully eradicated.
And the divergence between federal policies as promulgated, federal
policies as enforced, and local informal legal regimes—of which this
article’s story is a prime example—would continue to influence and
constrain land management well into the next century.162 Westerners
continued to expect timber to be readily available to them, even if under a
federal management regime. This helps to explain why logging came to
dominate the management of our national forests. This may not be a
tragedy, but it is unfortunate. Lessons abound for us as we confront new
challenges today. Hopefully, we will not be too slow in seeing them.
Merely avoiding tragedy is not always good enough.

162. Actually, it has even extended into the twenty-first century, as the recent episode in
Nevada involving rancher (and serial public trespasser) Cliven Bundy makes clear. See John M.
Glionna & Richard Simon, At Scene of Nevada Ranch Standoff, ‘Citizen Soldiers’ are on Guard,
LOS ANGELES TIMES, April 24, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-nevada-range-war20140425-story.html#page=1.

